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REMEDIAL MEASURES AND CHOICE
OF LAW PROBLEMS IN STRICT
LIABILITY ACTIONS FOR
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co."
The admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show
design defect in a strict products liability action has been widely contested,
and state and federal courts sometimes have used conflicting approaches. In
this type of case, state law makes liability strict rather than fault-based. In
general, federal law governs the admissibility of evidence when litigating in a
federal forum. Federal Rule of Evidence 4072 expressly excludes evidence of
subsequent repairs only if offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct. As
a result, some federal courts have admitted evidence of subsequent remedial
measures if offered to prove design defect, reasoning that the rule is inapplica-
ble by its terms. However, the harshness of strict tort liability has led other
courts to exclude the evidence when offered to prove design defect. These
courts have treated "design defect" as if it were "negligence or culpable con-
duct," making the rule applicable by its terms.
The differing policy choices have led to conflicts between Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 and state rules. The choice of law analysis required in these
instances confuses many courts and lawyers, and the courts of appeal that
have addressed the issue are not in accord as to which law controls. In order to
1. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
2. FED. R. EvID. 407 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connec-
tion with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving own-
.ership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
1
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understand the choice of law difficulties with this rule of evidence, the origins
and rationale behind the exclusionary rule will be discussed first in the context
of Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. In Flaminio, the court interpreted Federal
Rule of Evidence 407 as applying where the evidence was offered to prove
design defect, and decided that the federal rule as interpreted was controlling
in federal court over the state rule to the contrary.
Flaminio was driving his Honda motorcycle three days after taking deliv-
ery when the front end of the motorcycle began to vibrate.3 After he at-
tempted an awkward maneuver to ascertain the cause of the vibration, the
motorcycle began wobbling uncontrollably, and then shot off the road.4 The
accident left Flaminio a paraplegic. At trial, Flaminio alleged that the wobble
was due to defective design, 5 and proffered blueprints showing Honda's subse-
quent changes in design which allegedly corrected the defect.'
The plaintiff contended that Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was not appli-
cable where evidence was introduced to prove design defect, but the trial judge
excluded the evidence. Although both negligence and strict liability theories
were submitted to the jury, negligence was the only theory on which a verdict
was returned.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that Federal Rule 407 was applicable and concluded the evidence would only
be admissible for some purpose other than to show negligence, culpable con-
duct, or design defect.8
The court reasoned that the evidence could not be admitted to show feasi-
bility under Federal Rule 407 because feasibility was not controverted.9 Like-
wise, the evidence could not be used for impeachment purposes because "the
exception would swallow the rule."10 Therefore, the court concluded that the
3. 733 F.2d at 465.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 468.
7. Id. at 465. The jury found the distributor negligent, and 30% responsible for
injuries, and assigned 70% of the responsibility for the accident to the plaintiff for his
negligence. The Wisconsin comparative negligence statute completely barred recovery
because the plaintiff's proportion of fault was greater than the defendant's proportion
of responsibility due to strict liability. Id.
8. Id. at 468.
9. 733 F.2d at 468 (if feasibility of precautionary measures not denied by de-
fendants, then not controverted). But see Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d
1322, 1329 (10th Cir. 1983) (unless feasibility of precautionary measures is stipulated
by defendants, then deemed controverted); 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5288 at 144 (1980).
10. 733 F.2d at 468. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5289 at
148:
Subsequent remedial measures can be admitted as a prior inconsistent state-
ment of a witness, as specific contradiction of a fact to which he has testified,
to show his bias toward a party, to demonstrate his lack of expertise, or to
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purposes for which Flaminio sought admission of the evidence were within the
ambit of Rule 407."1
The Seventh Circuit then considered whether the Wisconsin state rule
admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures should prevail over the
federal court's interpretation of Rule 407. Although the evidence would have
been admissible under the state rule,1 2 the Seventh Circuit considered them-
selves "in respectful disagreement with the analysis" employed by the Wiscon-
sin courts interpreting that rule.13 The Seventh Circuit concluded that a fed-
eral court whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship is not required
to apply a state law admitting such evidence.'
4
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, like its state equivalents, essentially codi-
fied the common law.' 5 American courts adopted the English common law
view by holding that evidence of subsequent precautionary measures was not
admissible to show that an alleged tortfeasor's conduct had been negligent.' 6
Ownership, control, feasibility, and impeachment developed as purposes for
admission that were not covered by the rule.'"
The Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated by the Supreme Court
in 1973, but due to objections and proposed amendments, they were not
adopted until 1975.1s There were apparently futile efforts made to amend Rule
407 specifically to include strict liability actions, but the rule was enacted in
its original form.' 9 Meanwhile, the applicability of state provisions similar to
Rule 407 as finally enacted was being tested by litigants in strict liability
Although is is not clear from the Flaminio opinion what the specific grounds were
for using the evidence to impeach, the court said that permitting impeachment in this
instance was too broad an application. 733 F.2d at 470.
11. 733 F.2d at 468-69.
12. See D.L. ex rel. Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 595, 329 N.W.2d
890, 903 (Wis. 1983); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 258
N.W.2d 680, 684 (Wis. 1977). Wisconsin Statutes Rule 904.07 provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connec-
tion with the event. This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving own-
ership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment or proving a violation of § 101.11.
13. 733 F.2d at 470.
14. Id. at 472.
15. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
16. See generally 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5281 at 86 and
§ 5282 at 89.
17. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 90.
18. This two-year gap, among other things, allowed Congress to change some of
the rules relating to privilege and competency of witnesses so that state law would
govern in these instances. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv.
693, 693-94, nn.2-6 (1974).
19. See infra note 18 and accompanying test. See generally 23 C. WRIGHT &
K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5285 at 123 n.26.
1985]
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causes of action. This debate continues. 20
Two primary rationales are cited for excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. Originally, the evidence was excluded in negligence actions
because "such repairs were completely irrelevant to the issue of defendant's
negligence at the time of the accident."2 1 This rationale for exclusion in a
negligence cause of action was relied upon less as the meaning of "relevance"
became more refined. Although the purported ground for exclusion was irrele-
vance, it was really the possibility of improper inferences by the jury that en-
sured the survival of the exclusionary rule.22
Although called "irrelevant," the courts had in effect applied the balanc-
20. For courts permitting the use of subsequent remedial measures in a strict
liability action, see, e.g., Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, _, 565 P.2d
217, 224 (1977) (post-accident warning relevant to liability issue because failure to
warn where there is a duty to do so may be a constitute a defect in and of itself);
Marieri v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super 422, 435, 376 A.2d 1317, 1323
(1977) (recall letters admissible to show that the defect established by expert testimony
had its origin while the vehicle was in defendants control); Barry v. Manglass, 55
A.D.2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1976) (recall letters issued by manufac-
turer two months after accident which warned owners of possible safety problems prop-
erly admitted because probative worth of recall letters outweighed any prejudice);
Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 124, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251, 256 (1981) (use of due care will not exonerate defendant from liability, therefore
logic behind exclusion not applicable to strict liability); Matsko v. Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., 325 Pa. Super. 452, 473 A.2d 155, 157-59 (1984) (evidence of subsequent
recall notice of a strict liability action admissible because traditional policy reasons
behind exclusion no longer valid); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 525
(Wyo. 1982) (exclusionary purposes of Wyo. R. EVID. 407 applicable only if negli-
gence or culpability of defendant is in issue, not where action brought under strict
products liability principles of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A).
For courts not permitting use of subsequent remedial measures in a strict liability
action, see, e.g., Hallmark v. Allied Prod. Corp. 132 Ariz. 434, 441, 646 P.2d 319, 326
(1982) (policy behind exclusionary rule the same whether theory of recovery is negli-
gence or strict liability); Hartman v. Opelika Mach. and Welding Co., 414 So. 2d
1105, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (evidence admissible where non-party is the
repairer; court did not rule on admissibility where repairer is a party to action);
Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co,, 89 Wash. 2d 474, 483, 573 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1978)
(although policy justification of rule is minimal in strict liability context, subsequent
remedial evidence inadmissible because of the difficulty in weighing the probative value
versus the prejudicial impact on a case-by-case basis).
21. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 119, 528 P.2d 1148,
1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1974); see also 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra
note 9, § 5282 at 91.
22. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 92 (evidence of
subsequent repairs was originally excluded due to "irrelevance," but the operative con-
cept was really "legal irrelevance" in that the evidence was probative of the proposition
of negligence, but the prejudicial impact was greater than the probative worth); see
also James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 690-91 (1941)
(evidence is irrelevant for two different reasons: "because it is not probative of the
proposition at which it is directed, or because that proposition is not provable in this
case"). See generally, Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application
of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEx. L. REv. 371, 388-97 (1977).
4
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ing test of Federal Rule 403,23 and determined that admitting such evidence to
prove fault was too tenuous an inference to be worth the prejudice.2 ' Courts
considered it unfair to permit the jury to infer from such evidence that the
tortfeasor had knowledge of the risk prior to the occurrence of the event.2 5 The
subsequent repair could also be seen as an admission of fault by the tortfeasor.
This was considered highly prejudicial because the reasons repairs were made
were not necessarily related to the event that caused plaintiff's injury. 6
Today, the primary purpose behind the exclusionary rule is the public
policy of not deterring manufacturers from making improvements or repairs
after the occurrence of an accident.27 In order to protect the people who make
repairs from attacks on their moral compunction to make the world a safer
place, relevant evidence is excluded.28 This public policy argument has been
labeled the "quasi-privilege" rationale for exclusion. 29 These concerns leading
to exclusion of the evidence may not be so persuasive, however, in the strict
liability context.30
The leading case for admitting evidence of subsequent repairs in a strict
liability action is Ault v. International Harvester Co. 3 2 The defendant in Ault
23. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
24. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 92; J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 283 (1979); Wellborn, supra note 22, at 393.
25. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 95-96.
26. See FED. R. EvID. 407, advisory committee notes; 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 96.
27. See supra note 22. The advisory committee acknowledged the traditional
ground of irrelevance, but stated that "the more impressive ground" was the public
policy of not discouraging repairs. See FED. R. EvID. 407, advisory committee notes. In
the comments to the CALIF. EvID. CODE, the drafters stated, "The admission of evi-
dence of subsequent repairs to prove negligence would substantially discourage persons
from making repairs after the occurrence of an accident." See CALIF. EVID. CODE §
1151, advisory committee notes. But see Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co.,
695 F.2d 883, 887 (1983) (decision to exclude not based just on speculative ground of
policy, but it "rests more firmly on the proposition that evidence of subsequent repair
or change has little relevance to whether the product in question was defective at some
previous time").
28. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5282 at 93.
29. Id.
30. The possibility of undue prejudice is not so compelling if the cause of action
is based upon strict liability. The plaintiff in proving that the product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous must show that the risk to the user of placing the product on
the market exceeds its utility. See generally Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Lia-
bility for Products, 44 MIss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, On Product 'Design Defects' and
Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980). Since the foreseeability, or con-
sciousness of fault is presumed in a strict liability theory for defective design or manu-
facturing mistake any inference of culpability will not be prejudicial.
31. 13 Cal. 3d at 113, 528 P.2d at 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (1975).
1985]
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claimed error in the introduction of evidence showing that after the accident in
which plaintiff was injured, the defendant replaced the aluminum used to
build the gear box of "Scout" vehicles with malleable iron.32 This substance,
plaintiff claimed, was stronger than aluminum, and would have made the fail-
ure of the gear box less likely. The California Supreme Court ruled that sec-
tion 1151 of the California Evidence Code did not require exclusion of subse-
quent remedial measures in an action based upon strict liability.33
The court first noted that section 1151 excluded evidence of subsequent
remedial measures when offered "to prove negligence or culpable conduct. '34
Since the action was based upon strict liability for design defect, the court
recognized that culpability was not an element of the cause of action, and that
defendant could be held liable without plaintiff proving the breach of some
duty of care.35 The defendant manufacturer claimed that the term "culpable"
implied blameworthiness in the moral rather than legal sense, and that there-
fore the rule should exclude the evidence as it does in a negligence action.38
32. Id. at 117, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814, 528 P.2d at 1150.
33. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966) provides:
When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures
are taken, which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negli-
gence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
Most states that have codified their rules of evidence follow the substantive provi-
sions of the federal rule. For variations in language, see 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 9, § 5285 at 125 n.34.
34. See supra note 33.
35. 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
36. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15. Some courts, like
the defendant in Ault, have insisted that because it is the defendant who pays thejudgment, culpability is an inevitable inference. However, conclusions drawn as a result
of the outcome of litigation do not necessarily conform to the elements of proof in a
given cause of action. A plaintiff must prove different elements for different types of
strict liability theories. In a failure to warn cause of action, foreseeability of harm is a
necessary element in proving that the product is unavoidably unsafe without adequate
warning. Foreseeability of harm is not an element when manufacturer's mistake or a
design defect is alleged. See supra note 30. In applying Rule 407 to strict liability
actions, some courts will cite case authority where the rule was applied in a failure to
warn context to support applying the rule in a defective design context. Hence, where
foreseeability is relevant, consciousness of fault is relevant, and the possibilities of
prejudice are greater if the evidence is admitted. Where foreseeability is not relevant(defective design and manufacturer's mistakes), the policy behind exclusion loses its
force. Compare DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 229 (8th Cir.
1983); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn
Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980); Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 206,
311 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Ct. App. 1981) (failure to warn cases where subsequent reme-
dial measures was excluded) with Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695
F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 1983) (evidence of subsequent remedial measures excluded to
show defective design in strict liability action); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Ter-
minal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788, 795 (8th Cir. 1977); D.L. ex rel. Friederichs v. Huebner,
110 Wis. 2d 581, 610, 329 N.W.2d 890, 905 (1983) (evidence of subsequent remedial
measures admitted to show defective design in strict liability action). See generally
[Vol. 50
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The court, however, found plaintiff's argument more persuasive.
The privilege rationale for exclusion was rejected by the Ault court. First,
the court considered it within the economic self-interest of a manufacturer to
improve and repair defective products.37 Second, excluding the evidence was
considered contrary to the public policy of encouraging the distributors of
mass-produced goods to sell safer products.3" Furthermore, it was presumed
that the legislature must not have intended the rule to apply because the ob-
jectionable purposes for admission were confined to "negligence" or "culpable
conduct." 39
In Flaminio, the court concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was
applicable even though the terms of the rule did not explicitly exclude the
evidence for purposes of design defect or strict liability. The policies behind
exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in a negligence action were viewed
as being equally applicable in a strict liability action.4" The Ault reasoning
was therefore rejected. Although the Flaminio court seemed to acknowledge
the distinction between strict liability and negligence, it did not find the differ-
ences persuasive enough to justify admitting the evidence.4' Furthermore, the
court seemed to believe that the application of the Wisconsin comparative neg-
ligence statute made "culpable conduct" relevant to the strict liability action,
thereby making the rule applicable by its terms.42
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A, comment K (1965).
37. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816. Culpability in any form
usually requires some blameworthy state of mind like negligence, recklessness, or inten-
tional conduct. No blameworthy state of mind is required to hold a defendant liable in
a strict liability action. See supra note 30 and infra note 42.
38. Id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
39. 13 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815. This same
argument has been made with regard to Federal Rule 407. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K.
GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5285 at 124: "The failure of Congress to amend the rule to
cover products liability is not without significance."
40. 733 F.2d at 469.
41. Id. at 469-70. The concept of strict liability evolved so that the manufac-
turer could be responsible for injuries, and the product user would be compensated,
regardless of whether the manufacturer was at fault. Accordingly, state of mind of the
tortfeasor, or foreseeability of risk, does not have to be shown in proving the strict
liability action for defective design. See supra notes 30 & 36 and accompanying text.
42. 733 F.2d at 769. To the extent that responsibility for injury and blamewor-
thiness are equivalent, as in a negligence action, this approach may be supportable.
However, the elements of negligence and culpable conduct to which this evidence
would be prejudicial were simply not part of the burden of proof in a strict liability
cause of action in Wisconsin. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460-61, 155
N.W.2d 55, 63-64 (1967). It is true that a risk/utility analysis could be used in deter-
mining whether a product was unreasonably dangerous, but the foreseeability of any
danger does not have to be proven, and this is the crucial distinction. To decide that
proving product defect was equivalent to proving negligence was to rewrite the substan-
tive burden of proof in the state cause of action.
However, strict liability for failure to warn and defective design were'tried before
the jury in Flaminio. Because failure to warn, like negligence, requires a showing of
foreseeability of risk to impose liability, the prejudice of subsequent repair evidence to
7
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Flaminio nevertheless contended that the Wisconsin state rule admitting
evidence of subsequent repairs was controlling in federal court over the Sev-
enth Circuit's interpretation of Federal Rule 407."3 The court held that the
state rule was not controlling.44 Conflict questions between state and federal
law are subject to two lines of reasoning, depending upon the question in-
volved. The Flarinio court analyzed the conflict using the method employed
by courts when determining conflicts between state and federal rules of proce-
dure. It is not clear, however, that this was the appropriate analysis.
The Flaminio court first noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence, unlike
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are not expressly subject to the Rules
Enabling Act, which gives the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
rules of civil procedure. Rules so promulgated, however, "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right. ' 45 The court noted that federal courts
are constitutionally obligated under the Erie doctrine to apply state laws to the
extent that these are classified as substantive.46 After discussing the relative
merits of whether Federal Rule 407 was substantive or procedural, the court
concluded that because one of the reasons for the rule was distrust of the
jury's ability to draw correct inferences from evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, the rule could be classed as procedural. 47 In support of this position,
the court cited language from Hanna v. Plumer,48 declaring that where a fed-
eral rule of civil procedure was in direct conflict with a state rule to the con-
trary, the federal rule would be valid and controlling if it could be rationally
the defendant may be undue. See DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222,
229 (8th Cir. 1983). The Wisconsin Supreme Court however, in a similar action, de-
cided that the proper remedy for the possible prejudice was a limiting instruction, not
exclusion of the evidence. See D.L. ex rel. Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581,
610, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903 (1983).
43. 733 F.2d at 470.
44. Id. at 472. Most federal circuit court opinions dealing with whether Rule
407 is applicable in a strict liability action have engaged in very little discussion of
whether state or federal law should govern if in conflict. See, e.g., Josephs v. Harris
Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3rd Cir. 1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (2d Cir.
1980) (no discussion of the issue). Cf. Moe v. Avions Mareel Dassault-Breguet Avia-
tion, 727 F.2d 917, 931 (10th Cir. 1984) (dicta indicating that admissibility of evi-
dence in diversity actions not governed exclusively by the Federal Rules of Evidence);
Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1983)
(state substantive law applies, sufficiency of evidence governed by state law, and admis-
sibility of evidence, as a matter of procedure, is governed by federal rules).
45. 733 F.2d at 470. The text of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982), in pertinent part provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and pro-
cedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions . . . such
rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right, and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury.
46. 733 F.2d at 471.
47. Id. at 471-72.
48. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
[Vol. 50
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classified as procedural. 49 The court considered the substantive underpinnings
of the evidence rule, but dismissed these since the rule was arguably
procedural. 50
In Hanna v. Plumer, plaintiff served defendant executor as provided in
the federal rule; defendant contended that service was improper since in-hand
service was not made pursuant to the state rule.51 The Supreme Court held
that service of process was proper, and was controlled by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(1) in a diversity action in federal court. 52
The majority in Hanna rejected the argument that Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins53 limited the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
First, the Court found that the facts of this case did not implicate the equal
protection and forum shopping problems to which the Erie decision was ad-
dressed. 55 The application of the federal rule did not so alter "the mode of
enforcement of state created rights" as to raise any substantial equal protec-
tion claim. 56 Furthermore, the difference between the rules would not be rele-
vant in deciding to choose one forum over another. 57
Secondly, the Court held that Erie and its progeny were not the appropri-
ate test for the validity or applicability of a federal rule of civil procedure.58
The Court noted that Erie had never been used to void a federal rule.59 Fur-
thermore, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were within Congres-
49. 733 F.2d at 471 (citing from Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).
The court conceded that the distrust for the jury must have been a "mild distrust" due
to the built-in situations not covered by the rule-i.e., feasibility, ownership, etc. 733
F.2d at 471. See supra note 2.
50. 733 F.2d at 472.
51. 380 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1965). The Massachusetts rule in question provided
for in-hand service upon an executor, whereas the federal rule only required that ser-
vice be made at the executor's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Id.
52. Id. at 474.
53. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the plaintiff claimed that the railroad's duty to
a trespasser should be determined in accordance with "general law" principles as laid
down in the federal courts. 304 U.S. at 70. The defendant railroad claimed that the
Rules of Decision Act required the application of Pennsylvania law. Id. The text of the
Rules of Decision Act is contained within the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24,
1789, 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1982), and provides in pertinent part:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply.
54. 380 U.S. at 466-74.
55. Id. at 466-69.
56. Id. at 469.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 469-70. Although the Court found that the facts of Hanna did not
involve Erie problems, it evidently wanted to make clear that Erie did not apply
anyway.
59. Id. at 470.
1985]
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sional authority to enact pursuant to the necessary and proper clause, any rule
that could be rationally classified as procedural should be held valid.6 0 The
importance of the federal policy of promoting procedural uniformity within the
federal courts was stressed by the Court."'
Justice Harlan took issue with this second ground for the Hanna decision
in his concurring opinion:
[F]or the Court attributes such overriding force to the Federal Rules that it is
hard to think of a case where a conflicting state rule would be allowed to
operate, even though the state rule reflected policy considerations which,
under Erie would lie within the realm of state legislative authority.62
Harlan believed that although the Erie policies did not require the application
of state law in Hanna, they still constituted the relevant inquiry whenever a
direct conflict between state and federal rules occurred.6 3
Hence, conflict questions between state and federal law may be subject to
one of two different analyses. Under the Erie line of cases, the strength of
opposing policy considerations underlying the respective state or federal rules
is weighed. Possible discrimination as a result of unequal administration of the
law, and the likelihood of a litigant choosing one forum over another as a
result of the law that may be applied are basic to the inquiry." Under the test
60. Id. at 472. The Court appeared to say that if the rule is constitutionally
valid, then it must be applied.
61. Id. at 472-73.
62. Id. at 478.
63. Id.
64. The Erie Court was primarily concerned with ending unequal administra-
tion of the laws and forum shopping which were occurring under the rule of Swift v.
Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). Federal courts had not been vested with the power, under the
Constitution, to declare federal common law. Such interference was considered to be an
unconstitutional invasion of the authority and independence of the states. 304 U.S. at
75-79. Furthermore, because of such federal court intrusions, citizens within the same
state were subjected to two different sets of laws depending upon whether one of the
parties were permitted by the rules of civil procedure to invoke diversity jurisdiction of
the federal court. As a result of the varying rules of law, litigants would shop around
for the most congenial forum. 304 U.S. at 75-76. The Court concluded that not only
did the Rules of Decision Act command the end of the Swift doctrine, but the Consti-
tution dictated the result as well. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945), the Court decided that
the federal court was obligated to apply state law where, if it was disregarded, the
outcome of the litigation would be significantly affected.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), even though the outcome of
the litigation was affected, the Supreme Court decided that the federal law providing
that the issue be decided by a jury should prevail where the state law provided for the
issues to be tried by a judge. 356 U.S. at 537. The Court looked to the state polbi.ies
behind the law, and found that the law was not an "integral part" of the state substan-
tive policies. 356 U.S. at 536. However, the federal policy of assigning decisions\of
disputed questions of fact to the jury was supported by the strong federal policies uh-
derlying the seventh amendment. 356 U.S. at 539. Uniform enforcement of state crb-
ated rights was not so compelling an interest in this context. Byrd therefore tempered
the test of York with a "countervailing considerations" analysis. 356 U.S. at 537-40.
[Vol. 50
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developed in Hanna, any federal rule that is arguably procedural will be ap-
plied regardless of state policies indicating that the state rule should be
applied.
The practical difference between the analyses is that under the "arguably
procedural" test to which direct conflicts between federal and state rules of
civil procedure are subject, the state policies underlying its law, as well as any
constitutional problems with forum shopping or unequal administration of laws
are effectively ignored. 65 Although Justice Harlan argued in his concurring
opinion in Hanna that the "arguably procedural" test was too broad, and that
the Erie policies should control,66 the majority apparently rejected this ap-
proach.67 This is usually not an aberrational result with regard to the rules of
civil procedure, since such rules generally do not involve substantive state poli-
cies, or implicate constitutional concerns like those addressed in Erie.
The Flaminio court applied the Hanna analysis automatically, without
discussing why Hanna was the relevant precedent."' The effect of employing
the Hanna analysis is that the state substantive policies behind admitting the
evidence are bypassed entirely.69 They are simply not relevant to the inquiry.
Because Wisconsin's evidence rule was closely tied to the substantive policies
of strict liability, 0 there are persuasive reasons for rejecting the Hanna analy-
sis in this situation.
In Wisconsin, because of the fortuity of diversity of citizenship, some de-
fendants will be immune from the admission of evidence of subsequent repairs
while others will be forced to respond to such evidence.71 It is not clear that
65. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. The Hanna analysis was developed in a case very different from that
presented in Flaminio. Hanna involved a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not a Rule
of Evidence. Because the Rules of Evidence were enacted directly by Congress, they
are not expressly subject to the terms of the Rules Enabling Act. It is the Rules Ena-
bling Act that was interpreted in Hanna. The Court decided in Hanna at the outset
that the Erie policies were not invoked by application of the federal rule. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text. In addition, the Court noted that the federal policy of
procedural uniformity in the federal courts favored the application of federal rules
where a direct conflict with a state rule existed. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text. In Flaminio, it was first of all unclear that the terms of the federal rule were
intended to apply when evidence is offered to prove design defect. Secondly, the rule in
Hanna was strictly a procedural rule, whereas both the federal and state rules in
Flaminio were grounded in substantive considerations which likened them to "quasi-
privilege" rules. Furthermore, because of the Erie issues present in Flaminio that were
not present in Hanna, it is not clear that the Hanna decision was intended to apply in
this type of situation.
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. See D.L. ex rel. Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 610, 329 N.W.2d
890, 903-04 (Wis. 1983) ("Limiting the plaintiff's proof. . . would limit the plaintiff's
ability to prove the strict liability allegation, even though a purpose of adopting the
doctrine of strict liability was to aid the plaintiff in proving the case.").
71. Where a plaintiff is a resident of Wisconsin, suing a resident defendant, the
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litigants would choose one forum over another as a result of this evidence rule,
but it is certainly a strong possibility. To the extent that the rule would cause
a litigant to choose one forum over the other, the Erie policies would be impli-
cated.72 In this respect, the rule would be viewed by litigants as outcome
determinative.
However, if the strength of the federal policy of encouraging manufactur-
ers to make repairs were balanced with the strength of the state policies un-
derlying strict liability, arguably the federal rule would control.7 3 Yet because
there is no federal statute articulating any federal policy on affecting the
plaintiff's burden of proof in a strict liability cause of action, it is hard to
imagine how the federal interest could outweigh that of the state. The Wiscon-
sin rule should be considered an "integral part" of the strict liability scheme
within the state.74 As such, the state rule should prevail.
Without rejecting the Hanna analysis with regard to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Flaminio court could still have avoided the Erie issues raised by
the application of the federal rule by interpreting the rule as being inapplica-
ble in that situation."8 Although it has been argued that the failure of Con-
gress to amend Rule 407 to make state law controlling in strict liability ac-
tions indicates a legislative intent that federal law control, 6 the legislative
intent argument cuts both ways. Because Congress failed to amend Rule 407
to specifically include strict liability actions, it may have been intended that
the rule not apply." The advisory committee intended merely to restate the
conventional doctrine,78 which applied only to negligence actions. Moreover,
since there are real analytic and practical difficulties in equating "culpable
conduct" with "strict liability,"7' 9 perhaps the court should have given the
terms of the rule their plain meaning.80
federal court would lack jurisdiction without a federal question. Where the plaintiff is a
resident of Wisconsin suing a non-resident defendant for $10,000 or more, the plaintiff
may bring suit in state court, but the defendant has the ability to confer jurisdiction on
the federal court by removing to federal court and invoking diversity jurisdiction.
A non-resident plaintiff suing a resident defendant may choose either the federal
or state forum if the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32
(jurisdiction), 1441 (removal) (1982).
72. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965).
73. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1957).
74. See Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Wellborn, supra note
22, at 401 (suggesting that conflict between Federal Rules of Evidence and state rules
be resolved with Hanna analysis).
76. See Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620, 624-25 (D. Me. 1984).
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 9, § 5291 at 157; see supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
78. See FED. R. EvID. 407, advisory committee note.
79. See Ault v. International Harvester, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148,
1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814-15; see supra notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text.
80. The Walker Court stated that with regard to the Federal Rules of Civil
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Furthermore, as a matter of statutory analysis in the conflict of laws con-
text, the Flaminio court should have applied the state law. In Walker v.
Armco Steel,"' a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the application of an
Oklahoma statute which was in conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
3.82 The Walker Court affirmed the analysis in Hanna but distinguished the
facts. The petition in Walker was filed within the statutory period, but not
served within sixty days after the filing date. Under the state law service of the
petition within sixty days caused the date of commencement to be the filing
date for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. Service after sixty days
from filing caused the date of service to be the commencement date. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, the date of filing commenced the action.8 3
Defendant claimed that the state statute of limitations barred the claim.84 The
plaintiff claimed that the suit was not barred because under Hanna Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 3 was arguably procedural, within the* constitutional
authority of Congress to enact, and therefore controlling.85
The Walker Court stated that the first question to ask when a conflict
arises is whether the scope of the federal rule is broad enough to cover the
issue before the court.8 6 This question of interpretation involves more than
mere statutory construction of the language contained in the federal rule
under scrutiny. The Court held that the federal rule was never intended to
"displace state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations. ' 87 The
Court then discussed the substantive state policies underlying the state rule,
and concluded that the sixty day service rule was an "integral part" of the
state statute of limitations. There was therefore no direct conflict between the
state and federal rules because the state rule dealt with the statute of limita-
tion, while the federal rule fixed the date of commencement. The Court con-
cluded that the Hanna analysis did not apply.88 Instead the polices behind
Erie were controlling. 89
Only if the Court had found a direct conflict between the state and fed-
eral rules would the two-step analysis of Hanna apply. That is, first, is the rule
Procedure, they "should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state
law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer
applies." 446 U.S. at 750 n.9.
81. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
82. Id. at 742-43.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 742.
85. Id. at 749.
86. Id. at 749-50.
87. Id. at 750-51.
88. Id. at 751-52.
89. Id. at 752. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949). The facts of Ragan were virtually indistinguishable from Walker. In both
cases the suit would have been barred in state court because service of process took
place after the statute of limitations had run. In Ragan, the state rule was upheld, and
the action therefore barred.
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arguably procedural, and if so, is it within Congress' constitutional authority
to enact? 90 To the extent that the Hanna analysis is indeed applicable to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the analysis in Walker is both relevant and con-
trolling where applicable.
In Flaminio, the language of the conflicting rules was virtually identical. 91
The interpretations of the language, based upon the respective Seventh Circuit
and state policies collided. However, the Flaminio court9 " did not interpret
Rule 407 in the light of the Walker Court's mandate that state policies must
be considered to determine if a conflict exists in the first place. 3 In consider-
ing this issue, the Walker Court recognized that the language of the state and
federal rules was procedural on it's face, but the substantive state policies be-
hind the statute of limitations were tied in with the rule for commencing an
action.94 As such, the state rule was applied. The Flaminio court did not dis-
cuss whether Congress intended Federal Rule 407 to interfere with the state
substantive policies regarding the imposition of strict liability.95 Given the Erie
implications of applying different rules within Wisconsin, the court should
have interpreted Rule 407 in the light of the state policies underlying strict
liability which were designed to make the plaintiff's burden of proof easier.96
Rioux v. Daniel International Corp.97 presents an interesting case for
purposes of comparison. In that case, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was held
to be controlling where the state law permitted evidence of subsequent repairs
to show negligence or culpable conduct.98 This is different from the strict lia-
90. 446 U.S. at 748.
91. See supra notes 2, 12.
92. See Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 468-70.
93. 446 U.S. at 749-50.
94. Id. at 751-52. Although the state rule governing commencement of the ac-
tion was procedural on its face, the state statute of limitations scheme was tied in with
it. Although the rule of evidence in Flaminio may have seemed procedural on its face,
the state strict liability scheme was tied in with it. See supra note 70 and accompany-
ing text.
95. 733 F.2d at 468-71. The court acknowledged the substantive policy grounds
for exclusion, but decided that since the evidence was excluded because juries may
over-react to the evidence, the rule was entwined with procedural considerations as
well. Following Hanna, the court went on to decide that since the rule was clearly
within Congress' authority to enact, Rule 407 was controlling. Id. at 471. This analysis
omitted the Walker considerations regarding the likelihood of the federal rule intruding
upon the state substantive policies. See supra note 87.
96. "[W]hether or not this was the Congressional intent, the commentators
have all agreed that the Erie rule requires the application of state rules with respect to
the use of subsequent remedial measures in cases in which the state substantive law
applies." 23 C. WRIGHT & K GRAHAM supra note 9, § 5291 at 157. See generally 2 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 166 (1978); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, para. 407[02] at 407-12 (1975).
97. 582 F. Supp. 620 (D. Me. 1984).
98. 582 F. Supp. at 625. ME. R. EvID. § 407(a) provides: "When, after an
event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is admissible."
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bility case where design defect is the object sought to be proved. The district
court of Maine applied the Hanna analysis to the direct conflict between the
state and federal rule, and found the federal rule to be controlling because it
was arguably procedural.9 The court noted that the Hanna test was affirmed
in Walker, and that in this case the plain meaning of the respective rules was
directly conflicting.100 Because Congress had changed some of the evidence
rules to incorporate state law in privilege and competency of witnesses, the
court concluded that Congress intended that the federal rule apply. 01
Rioux is different from Flaminio in that no interpretation was necessary
in Rioux to find a conflict.'02 Furthermore, there was no indication in Rioux
that the Maine rule of evidence, although based upon policy considerations,
was closely tied to the substantive considerations underlying the negligence
cause of action. The nature of the conflict is so direct that presumption of
Congressional intent to preempt state law in federal court in this area seems
justifiable. 03 Regardless of Congressional intent, however, defendants in
Maine state courts are subjected to the admission of this evidence, while de-
fendants in federal court are not. The significance of this result was not dis-
cussed by the court.
It is clear that the Seventh Circuit felt the evidence in Flaminio should be
excluded, and the court accordingly reached this result. The court interpreted
an exclusionary rule of evidence more broadly than the express language as
enacted by Congress required, thus imposing the "Seventh Circuit judg-
ment"(to be distinguished from the "Congressional judgment") regarding sub-
stantive tort policy upon Wisconsin residents and litigants. Furthermore, after
deciding as a matter of statutory construction that the federal rule covered the
situation, the court then proceeded to analyze the choice of law issue by bra-
zenly disregarding the existence of the rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court in Walker. Walker teaches that the analysis required to determine
whether a federal rule is broad enough to cover the issue under scrutiny in the
conflict of law context involves thorough analysis of the state policies which
support the state rule. It is not simply a matter of statutory construction of the
federal language in the federal rule. This is what Walker tells us, and that is
why the Seventh Circuit ignored Walker. Rational consideration and applica-
tion of Walker would have dictated a result that the Seventh Circuit simply
did not want to reach.
NANCY P. INMAN
99. 582 F. Supp. at 624. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
100. 582 F. Supp. at 624 n.6.
101. Id. at 625.
102. Id. at 624 n.6.
103. Evidence offered to prove negligence falls directly within the terms of the
federal rule, and is explicitly outside of the state rule. This is unlike the Flaminio
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